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Throughout the twentieth century and during the lives of the three gener-
ations explored in this book, a change in gender contracts has taken place. 
The dominant family model has changed from the agrarian family at the 
start of the century, where women and men contributed to the survival of 
the family within separate working spheres, to the male provider/female 
carer family of the middle of the century, where providing through gain-
ful work was the responsibility of men and taking care of the home and 
the children was the responsibility of women. Later models were the dual- 
earner family of the first gender battle in the 1970s and 1980s, where the 
norms about domestic work had changed without practice quite keeping 
up, and finally, the dual-earner/dual-carer family of the new millennium, 
where women and men try to share domestic work and childcare in a 
way they find personally fair, or, in some cases, acknowledge that it is not 
 possible, given their preferences or conditions of the work market.
What has happened to gender in these processes? Where have they 
brought the project of gender equality? What place did the feelings of 
gender have in these processes of social transformation? In this final 
chapter I will attempt to summarise some of the answers that arise from 
the approach to gender and social transformation used in the book. I 
have followed Raymond Williams’ recommendation to start with ‘the 
whole way of life’ when trying to understand changing cultural forms 
(see Chaps. 1 and 2). As a methodological consequence of this, I have not 
isolated feelings of gender from the context in which they emerged, but 
have gradually differentiated them out analytically as a particular social 
form. I will now put them back into the frame of the whole way of life 
where they belong and have their impact.
The dominant patterns of life choices of each generation make sense in 
the light of structural and political conditions: the agrarian family at the 
beginning of the century was a family of scarcity and no security net—it 
was about surviving, not justice. The male provider/female carer family of 
the mid-twentieth century could rely on increasing living standards and a 
policy that encouraged women to stay home. The dual-breadwinner fam-
ily encountered the increasing demand of women in the workforce and 
an extended social security system. And finally the dual-earner/dual-carer 
family became possible with state-provided family–work schemes and the 
fact that women now were often more educated than men. The increas-
ing pressure in the labour market also put limits on how far the shar-
ing could go in this generation, especially in families where one or both 
parents worked in career jobs in the private sector. The different fam-
ily form were interpreted, inspired and rationalised through dominating 
discourses of the time, especially the norm of obligation to one’s family 
early in the century, the importance attached to the home, motherly care 
and safe childhoods in the post-war period, the discourses about women’s 
rights and gender equality from the 1970s, and the increased emphasis 
on individualism towards the end of the century.
The main perspective in the book has been to explore to what degree 
the patterns of dominant life choices and the recognition of the discourses 
that went along with them also had an emotional sounding board, and 
to what extent one may say that the different family models were emo-
tionally driven by feelings of gender or sometimes in tension with them. 
How did the changes in social gender contracts become something that 
women and men not only dutifully took part in, but also, to varying 
degrees, even wanted to contribute to? What are the emotional links 
between structure and agency at a given historical moment? The analysis 
has indicated that the emotional energy invested in life choices tends to 
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be unequally distributed between women and men belonging to the same 
generations. This lack of simultaneity has produced tensions that may 
be seen as pressure towards change. In this way feelings of gender can be 
seen as active sources in processes of historical transformation.
 Emotional Links
From their childhood, the oldest generation carried a deep mentality of 
work and feeling of obligations to their families. Work and family were 
fundamentally positive entities, which is not to say that they were without 
problems, hardships or sorrows. These feelings come in gendered versions 
connected to the hierarchy between men and women, the different valu-
ation of their work, and their social positions, duties and entitlements. 
These asymmetries sometimes tinge the women’s positive feelings about 
work and family with a hint of bitterness, especially towards other women 
who managed to get a larger share within this given hierarchical order. As 
we have seen, these experiences were processed in their relationships with 
their parents, where the women’s idealisation of their fathers and ambiva-
lence towards their mothers were stronger than the men’s idealisation 
of their mothers and ambivalence towards their fathers. The outcome 
was gender identities and gendered subjectivities that existed in concur-
rence, but also in some tension with the changing sociocultural context. 
Especially at a historical moment where many signs conveyed that a new 
world was emerging, the father’s connection to the outer world may have 
increased the young women’s attachment to him and their ambivalence 
towards their mothers, whose authority was bound to the house and wan-
ing in the new times. This may also explain the more positive images of 
mothers in the middle classes where the mothers both had more time for 
the children and encouraged education and less obligation towards the 
family for both sons and daughters.
It is especially the asymmetry in feelings connected to femininity that 
represents an important emotional tension between women and men in 
this generation. As they came of age, the men’s experiences of their own 
bodies constructed and confirmed the figure of the strong, working and 
heterosexual man, and of the exposed female body that could so easily 
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become a victim not only of hard work, but also of the men’s own sexual-
ity. The women connected the reproductive aspects of their own bodies 
to the general curse of womankind, and silenced their fascination and 
desires for the wild and fun men. The men’s feelings of guilt and moral 
compassion with the kind and too hardworking women are the most 
forceful emotional link identified in this generation’s life choices. The men 
wanted their wives to stay at home so that they would not have as hard 
a life as their mothers, and the economic and political situation in this 
period made this possible. The men themselves were prepared to work 
hard to make it happen and at the same time to prove themselves as good 
and successful men. In this way they also indirectly kept up the invis-
ible care they had received from their mothers during their childhood, 
including demarcating their own identities even more sharply from the 
female world. The price they paid was distance to their own children and 
a wife who complied with the arrangement with emotional reservation, 
indolence or silent discontent. Together they cooperated in their married 
life to refine the complementary gender order of nice women and respon-
sible men. However, the emotional upgrading of femininity by the men 
from invisible mothers to caring wives ran opposite to the women’s emo-
tional downgrading of masculinity from fun fathers to boring providers.
The refined gender complementarity created by their parents contrib-
uted to a destabilising of the very same gender order in the next gen-
eration. The absent father and the available but often discontent mother 
frame the childhood of the middle generation in the middle of the cen-
tury. The move from a rural to an urban setting took out the imme-
diate meaningfulness of the mother’s work in the home seen from the 
child’s perspective, while (real) work and money became connected to 
men. This family arrangement created a rift in the social bond between 
sons and fathers and daughters and mothers. The fathers’ work became 
more abstract as it was done outside the reach of the children, and the 
mothers did not need much help in their small, modern city depart-
ments. Children were sent out to play with each other instead, and both 
girls and boys were urged to prioritise their homework in the new co-ed 
school from this period. ‘The policy for daughters’ of the 1950s and 
1960s accentuated the rift between mothers and daughters in spite of 
being backed up by the mothers themselves. The relatively gender-neutral 
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upbringing in post-war Scandinavia seems to have played a crucial role in 
the processes of change because it could connect to many other societal 
trends pointing in the same direction. The positive feelings connected 
to family and family obligations, duty and hard work lost their material 
and structural basis. The disidentifications and cross-identifications with 
parents in this generation of children lead to the psychological challenge 
of redefining the meaning of one’s own gender through an identification 
with the other. Heterosexuality became a way for the men to confirm the 
masculine side of their identification once they came of age, which meant 
that the now-blurrier gender border became important to safeguard. The 
women put the heterosexual relationship in the service of liberation from 
their parents. This put them in a paradoxical situation where they exag-
gerated traditional femininity in order to become free. As young adults 
they recognised the futility of this strategy and instead headed for becom-
ing individuals themselves.
The tension between women and men in this generation concerns how 
to interpret the gender border. The women tended to see it as a source of 
power and inequality and wanted to degender work and care, whereas the 
men could identify with care work only if the gender border was upheld 
with regard to money and sexuality. In the narratives of this generation 
the most forceful emotional link identified in their life choices is repre-
sented by the women who wanted to be different from their mothers 
and more like their fathers, and who had the expansion of the educa-
tional system and the increasing demand of female labour on their side. 
The men complied passively as they had a drive towards becoming bet-
ter fathers than their own fathers had been, but they did not identify to 
the same degree with housework and joint responsibility for the home. 
They felt attacked by the connection the women made between gender 
and inequality, and feared that the women would disappear as attrac-
tive sexual objects. The women’s project of becoming individuals could 
eventually draw on the arguments from the Women’s Movement and the 
emerging gender-equality politics. The way forward was less clear for the 
men in this generation. What is a man if the sexual gender border disap-
pears or he embodies more and more feminine psychological capacities? 
And what happened to the attendance he was accustomed to from his 
mother? The result was the dual-earner family, where the norm was to 
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share work and care, but where the men’s engagement was often more 
in principle than in practice, which ignited the many private and pub-
lic gender battles in this generation. What complicated the situation for 
the women was also that their emotional ambivalence, sometimes even 
contempt, for traditional femininity as represented by their mothers and 
their attraction to male liberators sometimes interfered with their rela-
tionships with other women and also could make them unclear in their 
relationships with men.
In spite of the gender battles and divorces experienced in their child-
hood, the idea of family regained a positive emotional content in the 
youngest generation. They saw their family as a relational universe, a 
place for care and communication and sometimes even fun. The busy 
parents and the basically good terms that existed between children and 
parents moved the relationship towards partnership and mutual depen-
dency rather than a relationship of authority. The children helped out 
more than in the previous generation as both parents worked outside 
the home, and they saw their parents as fallible and vulnerable human 
beings, sometimes with unfulfilled life dreams, burnouts and divorces. 
The gradual degendering of work and care made their emotional images 
of the parents and their own gender identities and gendered subjectivi-
ties more open. The mixture of individualism and gender was seen when 
this generation came of age: girls felt less obliged to fit into norms of 
passivity and femininity when it came to sexual encounters. However, in 
practice an active approach to sexuality risked being interpreted within a 
conventional gender framework and positioned them as either dependent 
or monstrous women.
The dominant emotional link identified in this generation's life choices, 
found both in the women and the men, is the trust in the parents and 
the basic feeling of being first and foremost an individual with all rights 
and possibilities at hand. They wanted to continue the family form of 
their parents, but with more fairness, fewer quarrels, less stress and fewer 
divorces. For the young women the choice of education was not made 
with regard to future family obligation as in the previous generation, and 
from an early age they were aware of the importance of sharing work in 
the family. For the men the division of work in their childhood families 
had more emotional impact on their expectations of family life. None of 
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them questioned the norm of sharing, but handled it differently depend-
ing on their family experiences. The partnership this generation had 
experienced in their childhood families moved the gender battles towards 
a more principal norm of fairness where doing what one is best at or 
likes the best seems more important than sharing everything completely 
evenly. The tension between women and men in this generation is the 
concealed re-emergence of gendered structures within the framework of 
a partnership. The arrival of children was also a challenge in this genera-
tion, in addition to tougher conditions in the labour market in the new 
millennium. The problems were mostly interpreted in terms of their own 
ambivalences—wanting a career, to be a good parent, to keep fit and 
spend time with friends—rather than formulated as a critique of their 
partner. The general picture among the informants we meet at 40 is that 
men and women negotiate the outer demands as well as their inner splits 
in a more peaceful atmosphere with each other than was the case in the 
previous generation. They either divorce or try to find a way together 
where gender is not relevant as an argument for different contributions, 
but sometimes seen as a fact of their current life or even as an attractive 
difference when it comes to personal relations.
The emotional links had a different gender profile in different genera-
tions and they also led to new dilemmas of gender. The choice of the male 
provider/female carer family made most emotional sense for the men, and 
the gender dilemma that emerged in its wake raised the following ques-
tion: what is a woman when she is not participating in the economy any-
more? The choice of the dual-earner family made most emotional sense 
for the women and the dilemmas that now arose were: what is a man 
when he is doing domestic work and care work? What is a woman if she 
is not caring and kind? These new dilemmas established emotional ten-
sions not only between women and men in these generations, but, as we 
saw, also within the individuals. In the youngest generation the choice of 
the dual-earner/dual-carer family seems to make emotional sense for both 
women and men, but not in exactly the same way, since their psychologi-
cal point of departure and the cultural interpretation of their behaviours 
are different. The dilemmas that arose now are: what does individuality 
mean for personal gender and for gender structures? Can you be equal, 
yet different? Also here, life choices introduced new problems: old gender 
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structures seemed to re-emerge behind the strong belief in individual-
ised gender. The generational view shows that when old problems are 
solved, new and different sets of problems enter the stage. This represents 
the dynamic of change where gender is continuously reconfigured in the 
intersections of structural, political and emotional processes.
Looking for the emotional links is a way to grasp the prereflexive 
dimensions of agency (Adkins 2004b; McNay 2004; Silva 2005—see 
Chap. 1). The emotional link has both dynamic and adaptive sides. What 
it highlights is that the emotional drives have a historical/socialised form 
and are not lagging behind structural and political change. The emo-
tional link is not only connected with the past, it also represents the sense 
of things in the present, and it anticipates the future to the extent that it 
resonates with new discourses and new structural life conditions (Aarseth 
2009a). This reflects Raymond Williams’ claim that no societal structures 
‘come first’ in generating social change: ‘New forms can flow from [a] 
particular form and extend in the whole organisation, which is in any 
case being constantly renewed and changed as unique individuals inherit 
and continue it’ (Williams 2011: 125).
 Political Links
The feelings of gender that gave direction to life choices and the experiences 
that followed from them also informed the attitudes to gender equality 
we found in women and men of the three generations. Norwegian sur-
veys on attitudes to gender equality show an increasing support along age 
groups (Hansen and Slagsvold 2012; NOU 15 2012), but are the differ-
ent generations and genders answering the same question in such surveys? 
Gender equality is an equivocal concept. It can mean justice—the right 
not to be discriminated against because of gender. It can mean equality—
that gender should be irrelevant to distributing tasks, duties, resources or 
privileges. It can be about individual freedom—the right to choose how to 
live one’s life independently of gender. In Chaps. 5, 6 and 7, the attitudes 
to gender equality were described in terms of different dilemmas: for 
the oldest generation the gender  complementarity model could be inter-
preted both as an expression of equity between men and women, and a 
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hierarchical social order that cripples justice for women. For the middle 
generation the model of sharing raised questions about whether equality 
implies sameness or has room for difference. In the youngest generation 
it is rather the dilemma between gender equality as an approved norm 
and the belief in individual choice and freedom that is at stake. There are 
also differences between and within the generations in terms of in what 
areas gender equality is seen as relevant. It may concern skill sets and 
divisions of work, reproduction and parenthood, differences in personal-
ity and preferences, sexual norms and behaviour, style and appearances. 
Differences may be seen as natural or cultural, and as worth keeping 
or changing. Models of gender difference may survive within a general 
embrace of gender equality: ideas about fundamental biological or psy-
chological differences between women and men, or that complemen-
tarity in some areas of life is practical or desirable. Thus, equality and 
difference, justice and freedom exist in different dimensions—and they 
move, disappear and re-appear in different places and different disguises. 
The positions on gender equality we find in the different generation are 
based on practices, cultural norms and feelings of gender, and these do 
not always pull in the same direction.
For the oldest men, modern gender equality is at odds with their own 
life project since it makes their own form of masculinity—and the sac-
rifices that came with it—worthless, and moreover makes their idealised 
wives a target for critique. They are occupied with the crumbling moral 
order in society and their critique of modern times is condensed in their 
worry about the increasing number of divorces. They defend the mild 
and kind motherliness of the feminine carer against new ideas of women 
becoming like men. For the oldest women, the belief in gender comple-
mentarity in work, care, skills and personalities is not so emotionally 
hard-wired as for the men. Women with agrarian roots rather associate 
the question with the asymmetries and injustice in the gender order of 
their childhood. The middle-class women’s focus is on equal capabilities 
in women and men, which they think ought to be more acknowledged. 
Whereas the men in this generation are loyal to their trust in gender com-
plementarity, the women are stuck in the tension between, on the one 
hand, beliefs in justice of gender equality and, on the other, the strong 
social norm of gender complementarity and gender hierarchy that they 
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have lived with. What women and men in this generation agree on is nat-
ural differences in sexual behaviour and that the body is a women’s issue. 
As we saw, both women and men in this generation adjust their attitudes 
somewhat to the new practices of their children and grandchildren, but 
it is not difficult to see the connection between their principal view and 
their generational feelings of gender.
The idea of gender equality has more emotional appeal in the mid-
dle generation, where many of the men want to develop their relational 
capacities and become more present fathers than their own had been, 
and many of the women want to get away from their mothers and have 
a more independent life. The views of the women in this generation vary 
from a radical stand for women’s right to self-determination and against 
individual discrimination, to a general support of gender-equality poli-
cies addressing social rights on the group level, and to a more pragmatic 
individual approach, where issues of equality come second to what is con-
venient or necessary for the family. Whether the fight for gender equality 
should take place mainly inside or outside the family is also a dividing 
line. For the men the discourse of gender equality in work and care is a 
much more palatable idea than the discourse of feminism and women’s 
rights which puts the blame on them. Yet, the problem of following up 
the housework in practice and the importance they attach to the sexual 
gender difference make almost all men in this generation somewhat awk-
ward when they address the issue of gender equality, even though they 
support it in principle. There is a time lag, but also partly a different 
agenda between women and men here: for the men gender equality is 
about getting close to their children and preventing quarrels with their 
wives; for the women it is about the fairness of sharing and getting the 
same opportunities as men in the labour market. For the radical women 
it is also an engagement against the sexualisation and objectification of 
the female body.
In the youngest generation the emotional appeal of gender equality 
has diminished for both women and men, not because they are against 
the idea, but because to a large extent they find that it has already been 
achieved with regard to work, care, skills and sexual norms. They feel 
more like individuals than as gender, and therefore only reluctantly 
 identify with the gender categories that are the foundation of any gender- 
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equality policy. But since they believe gender equality is already a fact, 
they also become quite upset when they realise that this is not always 
the case. In the context of the workplace this applies to both women and 
men; in the context of the family the reaction comes only from women. 
Yet, the women’s critique is often moderated by their own distaste for 
rigid regimes and their belief that people should do what they are best at 
and enjoy. This leads to a less ideological but perhaps also more disguised 
gender battle where, for instance, hiring au pairs and cleaners may help 
to keep up the belief in modern gender equality in the families that can 
afford them. The structural levels of gender discrimination are not always 
addressed or seen as something that is difficult to combat, like the work 
conditions in the private sector, where more of the men than the women 
work. Subtle discriminatory mechanisms escape the attention of even 
the most alert: Hilde and Pia were well aware at 30 that gender gaps in 
salaries are often a threat to attaining gender equality at home, but they 
did not connect it to the opposite problem, which they had not experi-
enced at that time, but which Guro and Tonje told us about: that women 
who make more money than their male partners risk threatening their 
partners’ feeling of masculinity. This complex cultural web makes gender 
equality much more of a demanding balancing act for women than for 
men. This dilemma is further accentuated as both men and women seem 
to appreciate gender differences in some areas. They tend to see feminists 
as over-the-top aggressive and ignorant of bodily issues and the pleasur-
able aspects of personal gender differences. They also tend to find gender- 
equality policies boring and preoccupied with insignificant details.
The changing feelings and norms of gender are intertwined with pro-
cesses of social mobility. The least engagement with, or even resistance 
towards, modern gender-equality discourses is found in the few working- 
class chains where there is no social mobility across the three generations: 
the female chain of Borghild, Berit and Beate and the male chain Gunnar, 
Geir and Glenn. In these working-class families sharing the work is more 
of a practical matter—which was seen both in the relatively fair sharing 
of work between Berit and her husband with regard to their work hours, 
and in Gunnar and Geir’s ‘knack with children’, combined with Geir’s 
shunning of housework and women’s tedious talk. In the  middle- class 
families it is a more ideological matter and traces of traditional gender 
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arrangements are felt to be old-fashioned and embarrassing, and must 
either be openly opposed, explained away or disguised (cf. Haavind 
1984a, b). It may also be the case that gender differences have a different 
emotional foundation with regard to class. In the middle-class families in 
the youngest generation, gender identities are mainly expressed through 
leisure activities, consumption and aesthetics, whereas work, care and 
household are losing ground as bases for gender identity projects.1 In the 
working-class families, gender identities seem to be more dependent of 
the work division in the family and this pattern may also continue into 
the next generation in cases of upward social mobility. This was the case 
with Kine, who had a high-powered job and fought for gender equality 
at work, but suddenly, as she approached 40, felt that she had become 
unfeminine and her partner unattractive as a man, which she connected 
to their untraditional gender arrangements at home. The Swedish histo-
rian Ronny Ambjörnsson says that gender often gets in a squeeze in class 
journeys (Ambjörnsson 1996/2005: 27). This may explain the overlaps 
of feelings of gender between the class of the childhood family and the 
adult family of a new class. In our sample this overlap seems to be more 
prominent if both spouses grew up in the same class and made similar 
class journeys. We also observed this in the oldest generation when a 
young rural couple settled in the city. In those cases the agrarian cul-
ture was more resistant to modern urban culture than in cases where 
one person grew up in the city and the other in the countryside (Nielsen 
and Rudberg 2006). Thus, the attitudes to gender-equality policies are 
connected in complex ways to gender, generation, generational relations, 
class and social mobility.
Degendering and regendering processes are not univocal; there may be 
contradictions between practices, norms and emotions. Gender norms 
may lose credibility, but practice may still be gendered. Housework was 
an example of this. The housework became less gendered in the middle 
generation, partly because mothers now combined it with paid work out-
1 A pertinent question is whether gendered work and care are actually gaining ground again in the 
new reincarnation of stay-at-home mothers, which has become a media hype in recent years. So far, 
however, it seems in practice to be only an upper-class phenomenon in Norway (see Aarseth 2015) 
and is not visible, for instance, in terms of changes in figures of women’s employment. At any rate, 
this idea did not seem to have any appeal among the informants we talked to in 2011.
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side the family and partly because the other family members participated 
or thought they ought to. This could lead to a masking of still-gendered 
practices, but it could also contribute to a degendering on a symbolic 
level when such gendered practices were interpreted as an expression of 
individual preferences. Yet when work and care are distributed according 
to individual preferences, they are also often regendered again because of 
habits, distribution of skills or feelings of gender. Individualistic explana-
tions of gendered choices may be seen both as an unaware reproduction 
of structures and as producing new understandings that gradually also 
affect practice. Degendering and regendering may also take place in dif-
ferent areas, such as a regendering of aesthetic imaginaries running in 
parallel to a degendering of most other areas in life.
Across the generations it emerges that positive attitudes to gender 
equality understood as equal treatment and equal possibilities are for the 
women in all three generations closely linked to higher education and 
often also to encouragement from their mothers to get an education, 
in addition to experiences of injustice in their lives. For the men in our 
study the link to education is not as clear. Here a positive identifica-
tion with the mother, the division of work in their own marriages and 
whether they have daughters seem to be more crucial. Gender equality 
is not as pressing an issue for men as it is for women; they go along with 
it if needed or if they see their interests in it. However, as we have seen, 
practice has in itself a transformative potential: the more men participate 
in childcare and household tasks, the more skills they gain and the more 
they tend to enjoy it. Helene Aarseth’s longitudinal study of families shar-
ing a gender-equality project indicates a dynamic process: it may start as a 
morally driven project about equality and justice, but eventually develops 
into a project of joint engagement and individual desire—and in this pro-
cess the different tasks that are undertaken in the family are also increas-
ingly degendered (Aarseth 2009b; see also Plantin et al. 2003). Aarseth’s 
point is that real change happens only when the project has moved from 
being an external demand to being an internally driven project that feels 
emotionally meaningful to the participants. This point echoes Raymond 
Williams’ words that ‘the absolute test by which revolution can be distin-
guished, is the change in the form of activity of a society, in its deepest 
structure of relationships and feelings’ (Williams 1977: 420). However, it 
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also implies that feelings of gender may sometimes delay the revolution 
or that new feelings may be produced at a different pace and through dif-
ferent types of situations than political identities.
What is striking when we look back at the interviews with the young-
est generation at 30 is that many of the gender issues raised here received 
increasing public and political attention in the following years. In the first 
decade of the new millennium more attention was given to the unsolved 
problems or unintended negative consequences of the official gender-
equality policies (NOU 15 2012): that life in the dual-earner/dual- carer 
family had become too stressful, that women’s own priorities also con-
tributed to the lack of equality, that there was too little focus on men’s 
situation, that more attention in society should be given to care values 
and not only to what is profitable, and that gender equality in work and 
care could be combined with an appreciation of gender differences in 
other aspects of life. In different ways, our youngest informants voiced 
the demands of their generation for more personal choice and differentia-
tion in gender politics already in 2001 (Melby et al. 2008; Nielsen 2004). 
Among the men, the wish to be at home and take care of their children 
or the insistence that gender equality should ‘go both ways’ was already 
present in many of the interviews at 18. Thus, these issues seem to emerge 
from everyday experience and this may be seen as one of the conditions 
for their political articulation. Political identities are also based on feelings 
of gender. It is not possible from our sample to decide whether there was 
a similar psychological readiness for new policies in the two older genera-
tions. However, from what we know of their life experiences, it seems 
more than likely that the educational policies in the 1960s and 1970s 
had a clear emotional appeal in the older generation, particularly for the 
women. Correspondingly, the gender-equality policies introduced in the 
1970s and 1980s had a similarly strong emotional appeal in the nor-
mal chaos of love that we described for the middle generations as adults, 
including the men’s emotional readiness to become more present fathers.
As we saw in Chap. 9, the three generations reflect the theories of gen-
der psychology of their respective times. The same could be said about the 
women and the different historical approaches of feminism. With their 
emphasis on justice, equality and freedom, there is an affinity to the three 
‘waves’ of feminism: from liberal and social feminism in the first- wave 
Women’s Movement, to radical feminism in the second wave, and the 
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post- or individual feminism in the third wave (Holst 2009). What the 
study of the three generations shows is that the influence may go both ways. 
Political mobilisation is not necessarily prior to processes of mental change 
in a population, but the political articulation can catch and help articulate 
vague feelings. The difference between the women in the oldest and middle 
generations illustrates this: there was no political movement to catch the dis-
content of the older women, positioned as they were between the first and 
second waves of feminist articulations (and, from what we know, none of the 
interviewees read The Second Sex, which came out in 1949). In contrast, the 
family policy of the time helped the men articulate their feelings of gender 
in a way that silenced the women and made them express their discontent 
in bitter remarks or in their unenthusiastic complicity as housewives. In the 
middle generation the Women’s Movement helped articulate the frustration 
of the women and gave it direction. And this point of intersection between 
feelings and politics was again framed by economic structures of increased 
wealth and expanding higher education. The sensation of new normalities 
was based in politics, structures, feelings and everyday practices.
 Gender Links
In the youngest generation women and men seem to have more similar 
projects, more of the same thinking about freedom and individuality, 
more shared beliefs that gender no longer matters and also more of the 
same appreciation of sexual difference in limited areas of life. However, 
there are also asymmetries in how this is achieved and the dilemmas that 
come with it. It is common to think that, due to the gender hierarchy, it 
is easier for women to appropriate ‘masculine’ values and activities than 
for men to appropriate ‘feminine’ values and activities. To some extent 
we have also seen this in the analyses: it was more culturally acceptable 
for women to do men’s work in the oldest generation than for men to do 
women’s work. It was easier for the women in the middle generation to 
take over and degender their fathers’ skills and knowledge than for the 
men to take over and degender their mothers’ skills and knowledge. In 
the youngest generation girls were more encouraged to play football than 
boys were to dance ballet. However, in the youngest generation the oppo-
site is also the case: it appears to be easier for the young men to extend 
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their masculinities with ‘feminine’ qualities like care and attendance to 
bodily appearance than for young women to become fully acknowledged 
as subjects of desire and power. The cultural and psychological sluggish-
ness connected to bodies and sexuality for women more than for men 
keeps interfering in the degendered areas of work and care in ways that 
are not part of their wish to keep sexual difference alive in other areas. 
The young women often must walk a fine line in order not to be gen-
dered too much or too little. They are facing dilemmas here that are 
more or less unknown to the men: take care not to dress up neither too 
femininely so you are not taken seriously at work or in a way that makes 
people see you as a boring neither-nor. Take care not to speak up so much 
that you are seen as dominant and aggressive, but not so little that you 
are seen as a dull woman. Take care that you do not earn less than your 
partner so that you will be left with the care work in the family, but do 
not earn more than him so that he will feel pussy-whipped either. The 
tribute to equality, individuality and free choice often comes with an 
unacknowledged contempt for traditional femininity that we also find, 
directly or indirectly, in both women and men in the youngest genera-
tion. The empathy with fragile masculinity that we saw in both the oldest 
and the youngest generations of women stands in striking contrast to the 
contempt for women who are gendered either too little or too much. The 
young women shun group identifications on the basis of gender more 
than is the case for the young men. The increased individualism in mod-
ern societies is in this way a double-edged sword for women in the sense 
that it simultaneously liberates them from old limits and inequalities and 
invites them to take part in something that is culturally and psychologi-
cally deeply coded as masculine.
Feminist sociologists have debated whether individualisation is 
a phenomenon that privileges men and the middle classes more than 
women and the working classes or whether individualisation take on dif-
ferent forms (Jamieson 1998; Skeggs 2003; Roseneil 2007). Beck and 
 Beck- Gersheim’s claim that modernisation gave the female biography an 
‘individualisation boost’ (2002: 55) is on the one hand undeniably right: 
gender differences have become less defined and legitimised by religion, 
tradition and family, and women’s lives have changed more than men’s in 
the last century, especially in the areas they mention (education, work, 
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sexuality and relationships). On the other hand, it is also the case that 
the combination of gender and individuality is not so straightforward 
for women as it is for men. For women, being an individual and being 
gendered tend to be two separate identities that are difficult to inhabit at 
the same time. For men, an extended masculinity becomes part of their 
individuality more easily. This appears to be one of the cultural bedrocks 
of gender. Already in their narrative styles we saw more emphasis on 
self-development among the men than was the case with the women. 
The middle generation struggled with integrating the ‘feminine’ values 
they identified with in their mothers, but many of them actually used the 
newly appropriated qualities of emotionality to extend their masculine 
selves, for instance, by channelling them into projects of self- development 
and work qualifications, as much as they used them to take responsi-
bility for relationships with others. To be ‘yourself ’ was an important 
value among all in the youngest generation when we interviewed them 
at 18, but while among the middle-class boys this meant standing out 
as unique and unpredictable individuals, it meant being one’s ‘authentic 
self ’ for the middle-class girls, and for the working-class girls and boys 
meant being relaxed and tolerant. There is not necessarily any contradic-
tion between using emotional skills for personal development, at work 
or in relationships with others, but there seem to be some gendered pat-
terns in terms of how the emotionality within these areas connects and 
is displayed. In spite of the prevalence of ‘new men’, political scientists 
have also observed an increasing gender gap in the political attitudes of 
young people, where more young women than young men adhere to the 
basic values of the welfare state like social reform and economic solidarity 
(Christensen 1994; Øia 2011). The young women represent a ‘relational 
individualism’2 to a higher degree, where their relational capacities are 
used to increase their feelings of responsibility in society at large rather 
than to engage in strategic self-development.
2 The concept of ‘relational individualism’ is inspired by Nancy Chodorow, who first used it in an 
article from 1986 with the same name (Chodorow 1989). Chodorow used the concept in order to 
distinguish an object-relational psychoanalytic understanding of the self from a more orthodox 
Freudian version of autonomy. My use of the concept here is broader, as I also include the moral 
and political dilemmas of cultural individualisation.
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The characteristic switching in the youngest generation between gender 
as dichotomy and gender as irrelevant may illustrate a tension between, 
on the one hand, gender as a dichotomous structure in our language and 
thinking where it is almost unavoidable to automatically ‘gender’ opposing 
qualities, and, on the other hand, an experience of increasing irrelevance of 
gender in practice. However, it may also testify to gender having become 
a more flexible dimension psychologically and through this also less sub-
stantial and threatening. It is difficult to see the appreciation of sexual 
difference within certain limits as only products of normative commands, 
backlashes or defensive reactions in the youngest generation. Gender as 
‘soft assembly’ may be a historical product: ‘Gender may in some contexts 
be thick and reified, as plausible real as anything in our character. At other 
moments gender may seem porous and insubstantial’ (Harris 2002: 104). 
Muriel Dimen argues that the solution to the problem of splitting is not 
merely remembering the other pole, but ‘being able to inhabit the space 
between, to tolerate and even enjoy the paradox of simultaneity’ (Dimen 
2002: 56). What I would add to this is that there are not only new spaces 
between the two poles, but also non-gendered spaces where the poles dis-
appear because they are simply no longer experienced as relevant.
This addresses the question I posed in Chap. 1 about the relationship 
between destabilising a category and weakening its significance in different 
areas of life. Increased equality leads to a weakening of gender norms or 
makes the category of gender less important, constraining and exclusion-
ary in some areas. This does not imply that sexual difference disappears, 
but different sexual preferences based on sexual difference may be experi-
enced as more personal and less normatively constrained choices. The wish 
for sexual difference in heterosexual attraction expressed by many in the 
youngest generation is not claimed as general, unitary, recommendable or 
normative, but as a personal preference (until further notice). Within the 
youngest generation’s individualist frame of thinking, it is rather a claim 
that everyone should do as they like, and what one likes may vary. Thus, 
the connection between gender norms and desire is loosened. Heterosexual 
choice becomes one of a number of choices. This does of course not remove 
the still-prevalent discriminatory attitudes and structural disadvantages of 
non-normative groups in society with a magical touch, but it indicates that 
heterosexuality may also be understood and practised within a post-heter-
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onormative frame. The focus in this book has been the patterns of feelings 
of people living different kinds of ‘normalised’ lives at different points in 
time, but changes in norms do not happen in isolation from what goes on 
within other groups in society. Norway has become a multi-ethnic soci-
ety since we did our original interviews in 1991. Sexual minority groups 
have become more visible, and the majority groups have become more 
aware and in most cases more acknowledging of diversity. The intimate 
lives of people from different groups also intersect more. Just looking at 
the eight informants we interviewed in 2011, two have non-Norwegian 
partners, four have worked outside Norway for longer periods of time, 
one has experienced that someone in the close family came out as bisexual, 
one has had a brief homosexual experience, one had a best friend who was 
a lesbian, and one said he liked to flirt with both women and men. This 
is a huge change compared with the two older generations in my sample. 
The increased openness to homosexual and bisexual impulses in themselves 
may be connected to the multi-gendered selves produced through their 
generational biographies, as well as to increased contact with people living 
non-normative lives, and to the new discourses on queer rights in popular 
culture and politics. This also shows that there are no strict borders between 
the different groups, and that both straight and queer people contribute to 
changes in gender norms and intimate life (Roseneil 2007). To return to 
Raymond Williams once again: new forms can flow from any particular 
place and extend into the whole organisation.
***
In 1991, the same year we did our interviews with the three genera-
tions analysed in this book, the Anglo-American relational psychoanalyst 
Virginia Goldner wrote the following, inspired by Judith Butler’s Gender 
Trouble that had come out the previous year:
The cultural matrix that sustains the illusion of two coherent gender identities 
prohibits and pathologizes any gender-incongruent act, state, impulse, or mood, 
as well as any identity structure in which gender or sexuality is not congruent 
with biological sex. Thus, those genders and sexualities that fail to conform to 
norms of cultural intelligibility appear only as developmental failures or logical 
impossibilities. (Goldner 1991: 254)
10 Gendering, Degendering, Regendering 299
In spite of the undeniable presence of sluggish psychological and cultural 
structures, the multiple gender identifications in the youngest generation 
cannot easily be fitted into this image of looming gender binaries. Judging 
from the changes that emerge from the analysis of the feelings of gender in 
the three generations, the cultural matrix mentioned above hardly describes 
young people’s lives in Norway in 1991. Not only did we see more multi-
gendered identities and subjectivities in the youngest generation, but also 
that this extension had emerged gradually through complex social processes 
during the twentieth century. Activities and norms connected to education, 
work, care and ways of being and doing, have beyond doubt become less 
gendered. Degendering has also taken place with regard to bodily preoccupa-
tion and sexual norms and practices, but here the sluggish aspects are more 
pronounced. The cultural codes cannot explain why change happens, only 
what hampers and delays it. They do not say anything about historical condi-
tions or the subjective motivations for taking the small steps that gradually 
accumulate into historical change. The many ways in which cultural codes 
are lived and handled are much more ambiguous than the codes themselves.
Against this claim it could be argued that the sample I have analysed lives 
comfortably within what Goldner calls the ‘norms of cultural intelligibility’. 
However, the point is that in this process the norms themselves have become 
extended and more flexible, psychologically as well as culturally. The situ-
ation fits better with what Lynne Layton, with reference to Homi Bhabha, 
wrote in 1998: ‘the “new soul” … emerges from a process of inhabiting a 
sexed body and identifying with men and women in such a way as to dis-
place timeworn histories of hegemonic masculinity and femininity’ (1998: 
190). Maybe we are not quite there yet, but a considerable step has been 
taken in this direction during the three generations we have followed.
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